I am curious about how you can prove it, when even if REO's tend to sell lower, that is often attributed to lenders taking lower offers to sell the vacant REO faster, or physical condition etc. How do you measure the amount of a "stigma" to adjust for, when so many other factors can be present which might lower the price of an REO compared to a non REO?
A good and fair question; I need to make this quick.
I certainly do a statistical analysis of the market and trend the three different types of listing status (traditional, REOs, and shorts). I can use that data and throw out the outliers (low-sales, long-time on market, etc.) to get some kind of baseline trend. That, in and by itself, is not conclusive.
But what I also do (and I've posted this regularly on the forum, so this is my standard practice) is talk to the agents who participate in my market. I speak (or, more likely, email-correspond) with the agents/brokers on both sides of the trade (buyer & seller). Many times I do this before I've inspected the subject, so I may talk to 8-12+ participants for properties I'm considering (not all get used in the report).
The selling agent has an interesting perspective, especially when REOs or shorts are something that they specialize in. The buyer's agent usually provides a critical ingredient into the analysis; specifically, how did the buyers compare their purchase (let's say it was an REO) to non-REOs, and did the status influence their bid-decision? While the feedback from individual agents can be considered
subjective, the collective forms a consensus which is becomes
objective.
Some markets show a pattern of buyers discounting simply because of the listing status when everything else about the house is similar to non-REO sales. Sometimes the consensus is that REOs, while having a stigma in the past, have lost their stigma (traditional sale agents state that they consider the REOs their competition and price their homes competitively with the REOs). It varies, but I think you get the idea.
When the pattern is sufficient, sometimes a credible percentage adjustment can be extracted. Sometimes a percentage adjustment may not be possible; in those cases, an implicit adjustment can be made in the reconciliation process.
Combined (statistical analysis and broker/market-participant survey), the data is sufficient to (in my humble opinion) form a credible opinion of stigmatization and formulate a reasonable adjustment based on the market's reaction.
My experience is this: poor quality/condition REOs almost always sell at a significant discount to their counter-parts (non-REO/poor condition properties). However, when the condition is the same, sometimes a reaction in pricing difference can best be explained by the stigma-perception (especially when it is confirmed by the market participants).
I spend a significant amount of time analyzing the market beyond the 1004mc analysis in situations where the REO/short-sale dynamic appears to be a market influence on values. Do enough appraisals in the same markets, and the pattern becomes clearer (if it exists).
Not all markets are the same and reactions (perceptions) can change over time- even in the same region such as mine. Homes in some San Francisco neighborhoods have no negative reaction to their REO status assuming like-for-like with non-REOs. Homes in areas of the Central Valley/Stockton market can have a discernible difference.
The mix of the types of properties also affects if a stigma exists. In markets that are heavily saturated with REOs and shorts, those tend to be the competition that others price against.
In areas where there are few REOs (and demand is low), those tend to be the areas where REOs see the greatest discounting.
The clustering of REOs in a particular market does appear to have an effect on the neighboring properties (this should come as no surprise, but some may not believe it or it is simply not true in all cases). This is why it is dangerous to automatically assume that comps in an area where the mix is different (ratio of REOs/Shorts/Traditionals) are better indicators of value than the REOs in the subject's immediate area.
The trickiest markets to determine a reaction (in my experience) is where the REOs and shorts make up about 30-50% of the transactions. Once you get over 50%, they appear to lead the pack. Under 30%, they appear to trail the pack. In that middle-ground, sometimes nothing can be concluded (or, attributed to simply a listing status stigma). Like I say, this is in general and there are exceptions.
By the way, in some markets in the past, my experience and market participants agree that a short-sale would almost always sell at a low price given the uncertainty of the negotiation process. Now, in some markets, that is no longer true (per my analysis and confirmed with market participants). Some lenders are speeding up their negotiation and approval process, and buyer agents are now advising their clients not to automatically assume a short-sale will take an extraordinarily long time.
Also, in some markets, lenders and short-sale sellers are offering credits; especially for FHA purchases, to be more competitive. And, I'm seeing more lenders do cosmetic repairs (paint, flooring, clean-up the landscaping) before marketing the home to the public. In these markets,
many times, such homes compete equally with non-REO homes.
In the peer review I mentioned earlier, I said that my peer and I had a disagreement on how REOs and short-sales should be treated and analyzed. One of the reports she reviewed was in a market where there was significant REO and short-sale activity, and I applied an adjustment for this stigma. She told me she would be very uncomfortable trying to conclude a market reaction for buyer/seller motivations that included a stigma for listing status, but she did say that my report had reasonable analysis and made a credible argument for making such an adjustment. I appreciated her candor on the issue; and for sure, if she felt it was unreasonable and non-credible, she would have told me. :new_smile-l: