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Housing Bubble Bursting?

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The Mess That Greenspan Made ...

Or How Easy Money Has Changed the World


The Return of the Short Sale

If you lived in California about fifteen years ago you probably remember short sales - it looks like they're about to make a comeback. A report from Sacramento this week sounds eerily similar to the 1990-1996 California real estate bust, except home prices are multiples of what they were back then.

The possibility of a short sale arises when you need to sell your house, but you owe more than it's worth - like a fully-financed new car being driven off the dealer's lot, you are "upside-down" on your loan. That's a phrase we might be hearing a lot more of in the years ahead - "upside-down".

With home prices apparently falling in Sacramento after a phenomenal run-up in recent years, many of those who purchased real estate at last summer's peak and put little or no money down, today owe more than their home will fetch in a real estate market now crowded with inventory.

If, for one reason or another, these homeowners must sell, then they are faced with a few choices, none of which are very appealing:
  1. Sell the house, and pay the difference to the lender
  2. Walk away, and give the house back to the lender
  3. Make a deal with the lender to accept less than the loan amount
According to the story, Scott L. Williams of Re/Max, who specialized in this sort of thing in the 1990s, has dusted off his short sale notebook and is now out helping people hand their homes back to their lender with the least amount of fuss and muss. Going seven years without a single short sale, his office has done nine in the last few months.

The two cases cited, one seller upside-down by $30,000 and the other by $60,000, are likely a sign of things to come in Sacramento and elsewhere in the country as the real estate market continues to cool and prices continue to weaken.

Back in the early 1990s, this became routine ... but not at first.

When homeowners first began losing their defense jobs as a result of the Cold War ending, and as the S&L scandal widened, banks were reluctant to negotiate with distressed sellers who bought near the peak and then wanted out.

This was back in the days when most people had to put money down before a loan would be made, so lenders had a bit of a cushion to start with. It wasn't until housing prices declined by 20 percent, then 30 percent, and in some places 40 percent or more, that the problems really began.

In 1992 and 1993, lenders were adamant.

The seller had two choices - make good on their obligation or face foreclosure. Many people just walked away, "Oh yeah, Ernie got laid off about six months ago, so when the money ran out, he and Betty just packed everything up and left. It's too bad, because they just got finished remodeling the place before he lost his job".

So, houses like Ernie and Betty's would revert back to the lender and they would sit there for a while until the paperwork was final and the bank had time to take a look at the place to see what had to be done to get it ready to sell. By that time, the lawn had died and there were a few broken windows and maybe somebody had taken up residence on an occasional basis.

As the number of people taking the same approach as Ernie and Betty multiplied, the banks quickly fell behind and the amount of time it took them to get the abandoned houses fixed up and back on the market stretched out to a year or more. After a while, some lenders would immediately nail plywood over all the windows so that "guests" would at least have to break a sweat to take up temporary residence.

Lenders then realized that maybe they should be a little more receptive to offers of partial loan repayment, as the mounting inventory was requiring an increasing amount of repair work to get back on the market, and the worst part for the bank's bottom line - prices were still declining.

By 1995 and 1996, lenders were embracing short sales - they were becoming routine.

With a reasonably competent realtor, a seller could simply fill out a few forms with all their financial information (kind of like when they bought the house), and the bank would come back with their offer. Based on a sale price estimated by the realtor, depending upon their assets and income, the seller would be asked to make a lump sum payment and/or agree to a repayment schedule.

Depending on the particulars, this would amount to anywhere from zero to maybe half of the difference between the sale price and the outstanding mortgage balance.

If you lost your job and had little or no savings, it was fairly straightforward - the bank didn't ask you for much, unless of course you were dumb enough to leave thousands of dollars in a savings account and include that amount in the paperwork submitted to the lender. Usually it was just a matter of selling the house, paying all the transaction costs, and what was left was send back to the bank.

For those who remained employed but still had to sell, it was much more complicated. Then the bank would ask for at least some sort of a monthly payment to get the deal done. Sellers could always try to negotiate the terms with the lender, and some had reasonable success, but the banks quickly got good at this and the realtor was always ready to offer advice that would help an agreement be reached.

The funniest part about the whole process was how the asking prices were set.

The seller didn't really care - he just wanted out. The bank was inundated with borrowers in similar situations - they just wanted it sold and off their books. The realtor was the one that influenced the asking price most - he just wanted a commission.

These homes were priced to move and the neighbors hated it, "They're asking how much? They're destroying property values in this neighborhood."

Most sellers agreeing to a short sale didn't realize the income tax implications of the deal when they signed their paperwork. When a deal was made with the bank, money squirreled away in retirement accounts was untouchable, so if you had no other savings and very little or no positive monthly cash flow, you usually go off pretty easy.

Many were surprised to hear at tax time that they were liable for taxes on something called "debt forgiveness", where, to the extent that it does not make you insolvent, an individual must pay taxes on the amount of debt "forgiven" by a lender.

The idea was that since the bank was going to write this off as a loss, the IRS would attempt to collect it elsewhere, and the tax laws at the time required that if you were forgiven $40,000 in debt when your short sale was complete, and you had a net worth of $25,000, you owed taxes on $25,000.

If you were able to show zero net worth, then all was forgiven. The really bad news for some people was that the IRS insolvency calculation included retirement savings. In many cases this allowed sellers to get off easily as far as the bank was concerned, but not with the IRS.

News of short sales and of goings on in real estate in general didn't travel very well or very fast back in the mid 1990s, as the internet was still in its infancy and there were no such things as blogs, where individuals could report what was going on in their neighborhood.

It will be interesting to watch how the lender/borrower, foreclosure/short sale relationships play out this time around.
 
Moh,

I am going to stop responding to your questions because not matter how I try you will never accept an answer from me unless you fully agree. I have answered your questions.

You now ask if I consider the rapid increases to be normal? Answer: Absolutely-whenever the economic factors that create value put such a circumstance into place. When demand exceeds supply, purchasing power is enormous due to low interest rates, and utility is present, prices will go up.

You obviously do not agree.

Let's leave it at that.

Greg,

Better sell your house NOW if that is what you believe. (BTW, I've been in the business longer than you have).

Randolph,

I agree that trying to define all this is a problem. What one sees as a "correction" another will see as a "Bubble bursting". Hence my requirement that we use some sort of definition.

However, since you DO agree that hard definitions are a problem, why ask me?

I have posted mine- over and over. Apparently, I am the ONLY one willing to do so- but at least you will have my yardsticks to measure if I was right or wrong after it all plays out.

I will not accept the Japanese model (as some have posted) for application to the US market. The economies are wildly different, and, during that period, their economy underwent some watershed changes that had neve before been seen in the county since the end of WWII. For example, the old full lifetime employment model was scrapped. The markets are as different as were the SoCal and Chicago markets back in the early 90's. In SoCal, loss of defense and areospace spending hit the market hard. At the very same time Chicago properties were just sailing along and increasing at a modest pace. Chicago had undergone its economic change from rustbelt to service decades before.

On the short sales, they are very ineresting and nothing is automatic. Had one just yeserday in which the "short sale" offer was well above the unpaid balance and was at the same price as the orignal appraisal only a year before. That is pretty rare but it does happen.

Foreclosures will surely increase, or at least continue on at a rapid pace; however, in my view, they must be considered in light of what we think are normal markets vs. what has been happening over the past few years. But, again, time will tell.

I read the OFHEO testimony yesterday. Some weaseling and squirming, but overall, it appears that they are not too worried. For "bubblers", they did say that this drop will possibly be as deep as any they have seen since they started keeping the records, but their largest was 11% and that would not meet MY definition of a bubble nor that of the FDIC. The rest of the testimony pretty much confroms to what I have predicted.

But again, we will all be able to look back on this with perfect 20/20 vision AFTER it plays out.

Brad
 
Brad,

I am not asking you for a definition, or your definition, of a bubble or bursting. All I am doing to you is pointing out that there is little agreement on this term or phrase. I am also showing you that the term "correction" has little agreement with the exception that most people consider it to have negative connotation; a decline in values. The magnitude of the decline in a market correction is not defined or widely accepted. So in either case, bubble bursting or market correction, you can make up whatever definitions you like.

It is a very strange notion that the real estate market has and is undergoing a change from what was considered to be "normal" or the new paradigm. Pundits were rationalizing why the real estate market should have increased valuations, when the market was rising. Now, these same people have something to defend; why they are wrong and what the future really holds for all the people who acted upon their sage opinions.

The history of the Japanese stock market and real estate market serves as a lesson to all who want to understand what can happen to the new paradigm. You can point out all the differences between Japan and the U.S. and why you believe that such a thing can never happen here. But, just like the Japanese market correction, when the change in direction started, no one, you or some pundit, could have imagined that the loss in value and the duration of time would be so extreme. It reminds me of someone who falls off a cliff; on the way down, how bad does it look? Not bad, after the first 10 feet passes. Where is the bottom?

On the short sales, they are very ineresting and nothing is automatic.
I suppose you took no note of the statistics on ARM delinquencies and specifically on subprime.
The rate for subprime ARMs increased to 12.24% from 12.02% over the quarter but was up substantially from 10.04% a year ago. Also, MBA data has found over time that homeowners with ARMs have higher delinquency rates than those with fixed-rate mortgages, he said. Duncan expects ARM delinquencies to be a factor in the modest increases of overall delinquencies and foreclosures to come.
Hard times are not yet upon us however, the delinquencies on subprime ARMs are double digits. Can you imagine the rise and pecentages the subprime mortgage market is going to have when the recession occurs next year?
I read the OFHEO testimony yesterday. Some weaseling and squirming, but overall, it appears that they are not too worried.
I really pay no attention to what government lackeys have to say or forecast. Looking back on history, I can't see one problem they prevented so that the disaster did not happen. I can see where some bureaucrat was responsible for making matters worse.
But again, we will all be able to look back on this with perfect 20/20 vision AFTER it plays out.
I really don't believe that. The recession of 2001 proves the point, don't you agree? And the housing correction in the early 90's also proves the point.
 
Brad,
I accept your answer when it is to the point but your answer sometimes is like politicians answer. How can you say the rapid increase in value is absolutely normal due to the exceeding demand to supply without considering or analyzing the demand. Did you analyze the high demand to find out if it was a real demand or an artificial demand? Was the high demand for recent housing from people who wanted a home to live in or from people who wanted a second, third, or fourth homes not to live in or rent but to flip? You know that the reason Greenspan brought the rates down was to jump start the economy and create jobs but later on he found out that he unintentionally had created three headed monster from low interest rates, easy financing and speculators in the real estate market and decided to kill it and so did the new chairman. Unfortunately, Greenspan was too late to stop the monster because the cat was already out of bag. He did exactly the same thing with stock market earlier and you remember what happened. Now, rates are as low as they were a year or two ago, why there is no demand for homes anymore? Because two heads of three heads of monster are under control and the third head is shaky.
 
Moh,

Your comment makes no sense at all.

Analyze demand? Yes. It is almost the same now as it was 10 years ago. The percentages of owner occupied vs. investment of 2nd homes are within a couple of percentage points; there has always been a market for these.

When you look at it you see very little movement. Home ownership for the overall population is at or near its highest level ever, but we are talking about minor changes in percentages.

But you cannot analyze only demand; you must analyze all the factors. Utility has changed a bit but not much. We now build homes with bigger closets and more open floor plans but those are really minor changes- he primary utility of shelter has not really changed much at all. but, one thing I expected to happen (not based upon statistics- just a personal feeling) is that the boomers, who I had expected to downsize their dwellings after the kids are gone have instead opted for even larger homes. Not sure if that will continue but I was surprised by that.

As to supply, well it certainly caught up with demand this year. But, that is a natural market force. So, builders are now reducing their short terms plans (hence the lower profit estimates from the combination of supply/demand and the need to discount and the resulting lower stock prices for the biggies). This, too will find its level. And, as builder supplies decrease so will the available overall inventories. As supply decrease, it will ameliorate the price declines.

As to interest rates, they are about 1 point higher than the recent lows over the past few years (5 to 6 percentage points +/-). Slightly less purchasing power translates into softening of the market.

That is really all that is going on in reality- of course the alarmists want to sensationalize the whole thing, and they are dong so.

Abut the only thing scaring me right now is if the overall market begins to really believe the "sky is falling" mindset of these reporters and analyists who seek to make a short term name for themselves. It could create a herd mentality.

Brad
 
Randolph,

Starting with your last sentence, "I really don't believe that. The recession of 2001 proves the point, don't you agree? And the housing correction in the early 90's also proves the point."

1. There was NO recession by historical definition (two consecutive quarters of negative growth) in 2001. Per the goverment statistics, the only negative growth quarter occured in the 4th quater of 2001. Further, that happened largely because of the 9/11 attacks and the changes they occasioned, such as deeply reduced travel and hotel occupancy, etc. So, sorry, but I do not agree.

2. The housing correction of the early 90's happened ONLY in Southern California. It was not national at all. And THAT happened in large part because of the decision in the Bush I administration to cancel/reduce spending on defense and aerospace- both substantial portions of the SoCal economy back then. So again, I do not agree.

3. As to the Japanese economy, there were factors there that did not exist anywhere else in the world. It was the only place on the planet where the norm was to get a bank loan- unsecured- to start a business. You did not need collateral to do it. Heck I did it a few times myself. And, in a manner that I always believed was directly contrary to the Japanese mindset and culture, declaring bankruptcy had virtually no negative social implications at all. I thought this very strange for a culture where "face" was sooo important and where families moved heaven and earth to pay off debt at the end of every year.

Then couple that with the rest of the world starting to understand the Japanese methods of manufacturing, the penchant for quality (stemming from the inability to sustain exports of low quality goods right after WWII) that lead to the establishment of quality boards, and the like. The rest of the world began to catch up.

When I bought photo goods from Japan they had to pass the JCII- Japan Camera Inspection Institute. This was a quality board. You could not export a product that did not pass. BUT, others quickly caught on and I had suppliers in Hong Kong (still under British rule then) Taiwan, South Korea, etc. who adopted those standards but who had far lower labor components. Instead of buying the finished Japanese products, they bought the components and assembled them at a far lower labor cost. Ultimately they began to make many of the components themselves, further cutting into the market share of the Japanese producers. Samsung may be the vey best example of this (S. Korea).

The Japanese economy has always been at the mercy of international trade in modern times. The have little in natural resources. Understanding their loss of a competitive edge, many firms also began outsourcing for labor- Canon set up a factory in Brazil. But all too late.

This all resulted in a zero interest rate for over a decade but they could not simply turn around decades of business practices like guaranteed lifetime employment, centuries of cultural prctices and beliefs, etc, overnight.

This happened ONLY in Japan. it di not happen anywhere else in the world. It is for that reason that I will not equate what happened in Japn with what haoppens in the U.S or anywhere else.

Brad
 
Brad,


I'd like to know what the difference is between the media feeding the market psychology during a boom time and doing the same thing during a bust. In my opinion, media coverage very much contributed to the excesses of the boom; why should we not expect it to contribute to the excesses of the bust?
 
Brad,
You have to accept the reality. The housing market is a local market. It always has been and will be and everyone knows that. You cannot compare the housing market with stock market because one is real and hard non-liquid asset affected by local market participants, the other is paper and soft liquid asset affected by national and global market participants.
Yes, Southern California housing market and recession was due to downsizing defense contractors and closing bases in the 90th but it had domino effect on other states as well not as much as SC. Now, there is no defense contract downsizing or base closures but there is auto industry downsizing and may be closures that would have the same effect.
All you have to do is just open up any paper today and you see articles, statements, opinions or warnings about the real estate foreclosures. This is not an accident. You couldn’t see these things all the time on front-page papers a year ago. The same papers were talking about the marke boom. You may think that it is propaganda to scare people that the sky is falling but how come they were not there a year ago. Papers do lie and propagandize to a point but they cannot do all the time because some one is going to challenge them. Why don’t you email them your opinion and prove to the public that they all are wrong.

There was a Senate Banking Subcommittee hearing on US Housing market today on C-Sapan that I wish you were watching it. The panels were:
Tom Steven, the president of NAR
Richard Brown, the chief economist of the FDIC
David Seider, the chief economist of the homebuilders association
Patrick Lawler, chief economist of office of federal housing enterprise.
The following are the highlights that were discussed and agreed and they are supposed to have another session in 10 days:
That the housing market is at the verge of crisis.
That three factors precipitated to the housing boom: lowering the interest rate to 1% and keeping it for one full year, flight of equity investors from stock market when it went down to investing in residential real estate market, popularizing and marketing the exotic mortgages that made the homebuyers and investors to borrow more than what they could afford.
That the housing market is local market but 22 of metro areas and 89 real estate markets contain 75% of total US housing market.
That current forecast for the national housing marketdecline is 11% but it could be more and there are some areas that could have way higher than that.
That 22% of loans were adjustable loans
That second and third homeownership has been way more than normal due to existence of exotic mortgage and flight of investors from the stock market to residential real estate market investments.
That the housing market growth was 5 times higher than the average fundamental household income growth and was not sustainable.

This is the title of Inman news if you have a password

Real Estate Articles from Inman News
Real estate, finance experts raise red flags at 'bubble' hearing
ARMs, affordability are risk factors as market cools

Wednesday, September 13, 2006
http://www.inman.com/inmanstories.aspx?ID=56664
 
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Boom and bust the stockmarket, dot.coms housing oil agriculture anything

same scenario. Fools carry it far above the "fundementals" and panic carries it far below those same "fundementals"..always has, always will

Tulip panic in Holland; South Seas Investment; British Railroads; French Natl Bank; 1929 stock market crash; the oil boom of 1977-82...same ole same ole
 
OK, looks like the 'chicken littles' are being vindicated.
The following are the highlights that were discussed and agreed and they are supposed to have another session in 10 days:
That the housing market is at the verge of crisis.
That three factors precipitated to the housing boom: lowering the interest rate to 1% and keeping it for one full year, flight of equity investors from stock market when it went down to investing in residential real estate market, popularizing and marketing the exotic mortgages that made the homebuyers and investors to borrow more than what they could afford.
That the housing market is local market but 22 of metro areas and 89 real estate markets contain 75% of total US housing market.
That current forecast for the national housing marketdecline is 11% but it could be more and there are some areas that could have way higher than that.
That 22% of loans were adjustable loans
That second and third homeownership has been way more than normal due to existence of exotic mortgage and flight of investors from the stock market to residential real estate market investments.
That the housing market growth was 5 times higher than the average fundamental household income growth and was not sustainable.
 
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